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EVIDENCE- HEARSAY- PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS- The Penn-
sylvania Superior Court has held that prior inconsistent statements
may be used substantively as well as for impeachment purposes.
Commonwealth v. Loar, 399 A.2d 1110 (Pa. Super. Ct.), allocatur denied
(1979).
On November 9, 1976, the borough police of Waynesburg, Greene
County, Pennsylvania, followed a stolen van to a certain address and
arrested Thomas Ostrander, one of the occupants of the house, on a
charge of theft.1 Shortly thereafter, Ostrander allegedly stated to the
police that Robert Loar, who was in the house when Ostrander was ar-
rested, was involved with him in the thefts. Accordingly, the police ar-
rested Loar the next day. At Loar's preliminary hearing on November
16, 1976,2 Ostrander denied that he had named Loar in the statement
he had given to the police and also denied that Loar was involved in
the thefts.' Over the objection of Loar's counsel, the magistrate never-
theless admitted Ostrander's prior inconsistent statement for truth of
its contents,' and Loar was bound over for trial.
Loar was tried for theft' in the Criminal Division of the Court of
Common Pleas of Greene County, Pennsylvania. At the trial, the prose-
cution did not attempt to introduce Ostrander's statement into evi-
dence. Instead, the commonwealth introduced evidence showing that
the police had found the stolen van, with its engine still running, near
the house where Ostrander was arrested. Footprints in the fresh snow
led from the van to the house where the police found numerous arti-
cles which had been reported stolen. Nearby was another vehicle
whose engine was still warm and from which there were also tracks
leading to the house. In an upstairs bedroom were Loar and Ostrander.
Loar was in bed, wearing thermal underwear. Ostrander was on the
floor beside him, clothed. The legs of the pants of both men were wet.
Loar, however, claimed to have been in bed for some hours.'
From this circumstantial evidence the commonwealth sought to
prove that Loar and Ostrander were jointly involved in the thefts and
1. Commonwealth v. Loar, 399 A.2d 1110, 1112 (Pa. Super. Ct.), ailocatur denied
(1979); Brief for Appellants and Appendix at 3a, 4a.
2. The preliminary hearing was held before Magistrate John Watson, Waynesburg,
Greene County, Pennsylvania. Brief for Appellants at la.
3. 399 A.2d at 1114-15; Brief for Appellants at 13a, 17a-19a.
4. 399 A.2d at 1114-15; Brief for Appellants at 15a.
5. The Pennsylvania theft statute is at 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3921(a) (Purdon
1973).
6. 399 A.2d at 1112.
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had entered the house from the vehicles just before the police arrived.'
Loar was convicted and sentenced to pay costs of prosecution, to make
restitution of the property stolen if not already restored, and to be im-
prisoned for a term of not less than two years or more than five on
three counts of theft.8 Loar appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior
Court,' asserting several points of error.10 In an opinion by Judge
Spaeth, the court affirmed the conviction."
Judge Spaeth primarily considered Loar's argument that the lower
court should have granted his motion to quash the criminal complaint
because the commonwealth's evidence at the preliminary hearing was
insufficient to show a prima facie case." Loar argued that the only evi-
dence presented at the preliminary hearing linking him to the thefts
was Ostrander's statement to the police. The magistrate allowed
Ostrander's statement to be introduced as substantive evidence" after
Ostrander repeatedly denied naming Loar in the statement"' and
despite the defense attorney's repeated objections that the prior state-
ment was hearsay and therefore inadmissible except to impeach the
witness' credibility.15
In deciding whether or not Loar should have been bound over for
trial, Judge Spaeth examined the Superior Court's prior decision in
Commonwealth v. Rick,"8 which held that a prima facie case of driving
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor was made out where
the only evidence at the preliminary hearing was a hearsay report on
blood-alcohol content. The court in Rick had also stated in dictum that
if it were clearly established at the preliminary hearing that the only
7. Id. at 1112-13; Brief for Appellee and Appendix at 9.
8. Petition for Allowance of Appeal and Appendix at 1, Commonwealth v. Loar,
allocatur docket No. 1933 (1979).
9. The basis for jurisdiction was PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 183 (Purdon 1962) (now
codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 742 (Purdon 1978)).
10. Loar's primary argument was that the commonwealth could not bind him over for
trial based on Ostrander's prior inconsistent statement. He also contended that the com-
monwealth's evidence at the trial was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt; that the jury was impermissibly tainted because it included a juror who had sat on
a jury which had tried Loar two weeks earlier on unrelated charges; and that the prose-
cutor had made prejudicial remarks during his closing arguments. See Brief for Appel-
lants at 4-8. For the court's disposition of these arguments, see note 12 infma.
11. Commonwealth v. Loar, 399 A.2d 1110 (Pa. Super. Ct.), allocatur denied (1979).
12. Id. at 1114. The court rejected all of Loar's secondary arguments, which are
discussed at note 10 supra. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to prove
Loar guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; that the tainted jury issue had not been properly
preserved for appeal; and that the prosecutor's allegedly prejudicial remarks had been
adequately cured by the trial court's instructions to the jury. Id. at 1113-14.
13. Id at 1115.
14. Brief for Appellants at 13a, 14a.
15. 399 A.2d at 1115; Brief for Appellants at 4a, 5a, 9a.
16. 244 Pa. Super. Ct. 33, 366 A.2d 302 (1976).
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evidence to be presented at the trial would be hearsay then the case
should not be submitted to the grand jury." Judge Spaeth distin-
guished Rick from Loar by pointing out that in Rick, the magistrate
could properly conclude that more than the hearsay evidence was to be
introduced at the trial since it was likely that the commonwealth
would produce the chemist who had prepared the report. This was not
the case in Loar, however, because the only evidence before the magis-
trate was Ostrander's prior inconsistent statement, which, under exist-
ing Pennsylvania law, could be used only to impeach the declarant,
and not as substantive evidence. Judge Spaeth concluded that by the
reasoning of the Rick decision, Loar should not have been held for
trial. 8
Confronted with this conclusion, the court examined the old rule
barring the use of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evi-
dence.19 If a prior inconsistent statement could be used as substantive
evidence, dismissal of the charges against Loar was not warranted.
Judge Spaeth noted that in Commonwealth v. Gee," four justices of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had questioned the wisdom of the old
rule and had expressed approval of the Federal Rule of Evidence
which authorizes the substantive use of certain prior inconsistent
statements." Moreover, Judge Spaeth found that the practice of admit-
ting a witness' prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence
has been accepted in many jurisdictions. Drawing upon the rationale
given in the comment to the California Evidence Code' and in the Ad-
17. Id at 37 n.1, 366 A.2d at 304 n.1.
18. 399 A.2d at 1116.
19. Id at 1116-18. Eight years before Loar, Judge Spaeth, then a judge of the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, considered a hearsay problem similar to the one
at issue in Loar. See Commonwealth v. Burton, 54 Pa. D. & C.2d 264 (Phila.), aff'd mem.
220 Pa. Super. Ct. 737, 286 A.2d 408 (1971). In Burton, prior statements made to the police
by two witnesses were repudiated at the defendant's preliminary hearing. The magistrate
nevertheless regarded the statements as substantive evidence in the murder charge
against the defendant. Judge Spaeth held that although the orthodox rule adhered to by
the higher courts of Pennsylvania required that the statements be used at a trial for im-
peachment purposes only, it was proper to admit the statements for substantive purposes
at the preliminary hearing because they were in writing, signed by the witness, and the
declarant was available for cross-examination. Id. at 288.
20. 467 Pa. 123, 354 A.2d 875 (1976).
21. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1) provides in relevant part that a prior statement by a wit-
ness is not hearsay if "the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . inconsistent with
his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hear-
ing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition . ... "
22. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West 1966), and the California Law Revision Com-
mission's Comment to § 1235, CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 comment (West 1966).
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visory Committee's Note to the Federal Rules," Judge Spaeth held
that where a witness is available to testify and to be cross-examined in
court, his prior inconsistent statement, sworn or unsworn, is admissi-
ble for the truth of the facts asserted." Thus, if the commonwealth had
called Ostrander to the witness stand at Loar's trial, Ostrander's prior
statement would have been admissible for the truth of its assertion,
and it was, therefore, sufficient at the preliminary hearing to make out
a prima facie case against Robert Loar2
The old rule, also known as the orthodox rule, excludes prior incon-
sistent statements as substantive evidence because they were not
made under oath, the declarant was not subject to cross-examination
when he made them, and because there was no opportunity for the
jury to observe the demeanor of the declarant when the statement was
made." Until Commonwealth v. Loar, Pennsylvania courts had adhered
strictly to the orthodox rule.' In earlier cases, the Pennsylvania courts
attached great significance to the trial court's instructions to the jury
on the difference between using the evidence to impeach the credi-
bility of the witness and considering the evidence for the truth of its
contents. 8 In later civil cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was
23. Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Rule 801, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183,
295-96 (1972).
24. 399 A.2d at 1117.
25. Id. at 1118.
26. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968),
cert denied, 393 U.S. 1051 (1969); Ruhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. 102, 150 N.W.2d 146 (1967);
State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 251 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK[; Graham, Employ-
ing Inconsistent Statements for Impeachment and as Substantive Evidence: A Critical
Review and Proposed Amendments of Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)I1)(A), 613 and
607, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1565 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Graham]; Reutlinger, Prior Inconsis-
tent Statements: Presently Inconsistent Doctrine, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 361 (1974).
27. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gee, 467 Pa. 123, 354 A.2d 875 (1976); Commonwealth
v. Tucker, 452 Pa. 584, 307 A.2d 245 (1973); Dincher v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 356 Pa.
151, 51 A.2d 710 (1947); Stiegelmann v. Ackman, 351 Pa. 592, 41 A.2d 679 (1945). See also
Commonwealth v. Commander, 436 Pa. 532, 260 A.2d 773 (1970) (listing cases but declining
to discuss the issue); 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); 2 G. HENRY,
PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE § 801 (1953 & Supp. 1978); A. JENKINS, PENNSYLVANIA TRIAL
EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 17.13 (1974 & Supp. 1979); Comment, Evidence-Admissibility of
Hearsay-A Comparison of Some of the Uniform Rules of Evidence and Pennsylvania
Law, 4 VILL. L. REV. 117, 118 (1958).
28. E.g., Scheer v. Melville, 279 Pa. 401, 123 A. 853 (1924) (papers used to contradict
testimony of a witness may not be used for any other purpose); Dampman v. Pennsylvania
R.R. Co., 166 Pa. 520, 31 A. 244 (1895) (trial court must take special care to prevent prior
inconsistent statement from being used for any purpose other than impeachment); Com-
monwealth v. Blose, 160 Pa. Super. Ct. 165, 50 A.2d 742 (1947) (merely stating the rule is
insufficient, as it must be done unequivocally, and the difference between impeachment
and substantive uses must be explained).
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less insistent on specific instructions," although in criminal cases, if
the effect of the prior inconsistent statement was highly prejudicial,
the failure properly to instruct the jury was reversible error.'
Legal scholars have long advocated that the orthodox rule be changed.
The standard hearsay objections -lack of contemporaneous oath, cross
examination, and observation of demeanor -are not applicable when a
prior inconsistent statement is offered for the truth of the facts
asserted, since the presence of the witness in court largely satisfies
the purpose of the hearsay rule.8 The value of the oath having dimin-
ished, 2 it is no longer considered a guarantee of the trustworthiness of
testimony. The opportunity to cross-examine the witness at trial is suf-
ficient to bring out the truthfulness of his earlier statement and to
reveal the reasons for his change of story.' Similarly, the witness'
presence at the trial gives the jury an adequate opportunity to observe
his demeanor." Related arguments for the exclusion of other forms of
hearsay are that the declarant's out-of-court statement may be based
upon faulty perception, faulty memory, lack of sincerity, or a peculiar-
ity in his use of language which conveys a wrong impression.' Prior in-
29. See Wilson v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 421 Pa. 419, 219 A.2d 666 (1966) (trial court
erred in admitting a witness' prior contradictory statements as substantive evidence, but
counsel not having objected, it was not reversible error); Bizich v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
391 Pa. 640, 139 A.2d 663 (1958) (failure to request limiting instructions constituted a
waiver and lack of such instructions was thus not reversible error). In Wilson, the trial
court had failed to distinguish between the statements of a party and those of a witness.
The prior contradictory statements of a party qualify as an admission of a party opponent,
a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. See Mitchell v. Shirey, 407 Pa. 204, 180 A.2d
65 (1962); Lemmon v. Bufalino, 204 Pa. Super. Ct. 481, 205 A.2d 680 (1964); MCCORMICK,
supra note 26, § 262.
30. E.g., Commonwealth v. DiPasquale, 424 Pa. 500, 230 A.2d 449 (1967).
31. See 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018(b) (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
32. See 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1827 (Chadbourn rev. 1976); MCCORMICK, supra
note 26, § 251; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62
HARV. L. REV. 177, 186 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Morgan].
33. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970). See also Copes v. United States, 345
F.2d 723, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (upholding the admission of prior inconsistent statements for
the purpose of impeaching credibility and showing motive); McCormick, The Turncoat
Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 TEX. L. REv. 573 (1947) [here-
inafter cited as The Turncoat Witness].
34. In Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706
(1925), the court stated: "[i]f, from all that the jury seels] of the witness, they conclude
that what he says now is not the truth, but what he said before [was the truth], they are
none the less deciding from what they see and hear of that person ... in court." See also
5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1399 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
35. See 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 478 (3d ed. 1940); MCCORMICK, supra note 26,
§ 245; Morgan, supra note 32, at 188; Stewart, Perception, Memory and Hearsay: A Criti-
cism of Present Law and The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1
[hereinafter cited as Stewart].
1980
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consistent statements are not considered subject to these risks,
because the declarant is in court and cross-examination can clear up
any confusion or expose any defects to the fact finder. Some authori-
ties feel that the closer in time to the event the statement is made, the
closer to the truth it is likely to be; thus the prior statement may be
more reliable than the declarant's in-court testimony.n
Allowing the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements af-
fords protection from the turncoat witness who, unexpectedly or not,
tells at the trial a different story from his earlier one, denies what he
said earlier, or claims that he cannot remember events he had described
earlier."7 In criminal trials this generally occurs for one of two reasons.
Either the witness is afraid to inculpate the defendant in open court
for fear of the consequences, or the witness is a family member who
has grown sympathetic toward the defendant and has become reluc-
tant to inculpate him further."
A frequent argument in support of the substantive use of prior in-
consistent statements is that once the jury has heard the evidence, the
limiting instructions as to its use are ineffective. Juries probably
neither understand nor obey the instructions. 9 It would, therefore, be
more realistic to let the statement in regardless of the purpose for
which it is offered and then to permit the fact finder to decide if either
version can be believed.
Proponents of the orthodox rule argue that it prevents the manufac-
ture of evidence.'0 The answer to this is that such a possibility exists
anyway,41 and that the advantages of admitting valuable evidence
otherwise excluded by the rule outweigh the disadvantages of admit-
ting a minority of perjured statements. Those who prefer the orthodox
36. See United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929, 933 (2d Cir. 1964), cerL denied, 377
U.S. 979 (1964); Commonwealth v. Gee, 467 Pa. 123, 144, 354 A.2d 875, 885 (1976) (Roberts,
J., dissenting). See also MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 251; The Turncoat Witness, supra
note 33, at 577.
37. In The Turncoat Witness, supra note 33, at 575, the author suggests that "[the
orthodox] doctrine is highly inconvenient, not to say poisonous to the interests of a party
who has had the misfortune of having his crucial witness persuaded, suborned, seduced,
or intimidated into changing his story." See also Stalmack, Prior Inconsistent State-
ments: Congress Takes a Compromising Step Backward in Enacting Rule 801(d)(1)(A), 8
Loy. CHI. L.J. 251, 252 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Stalmack].
38. See Silbert, Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1(A), 49 TEMPLE L.Q. 880 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Silbert].
39. United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d at 933; United States ex rel. Ng Kee Wong v.
Corsi, 64 F.2d 564, 565 (2d Cir. 1933); 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018(b) (Chadbourn iev.
1970); Morgan, supra note 32, at 193; The Turncoat Witness, supra note 33, at 580;
Graham, supra note 26, at 1572. But see United States v. Schwartz, 390 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir.
1968) where the court expressed the view that juries do understand the instructions.
40. State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 362, 285 N.W. 898, 901 (1939).
41. See The Turncoat Witness, supra note 33, at 586.
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rule also express the fear that the substantive use of prior inconsistent
statements in a criminal proceeding might lead to a conviction based
solely upon a prior inconsistent statement." There need be no risk of
such a conviction if the courts are careful not to confuse admissibility
with sufficiency of the evidence.'"
In addition to the changes in the common law approach urged and
endorsed by the scholars, there have been various statutory changes
to the old rule. The English Evidence Act of 1938" allowed for the ad-
mission, as evidence of the fact stated, of any previous written state-
ment made by a person with first-hand knowledge and who is called as
a witness at the trial. The English Civil Evidence Act of 1968'5 allows
for the admissibility in a civil proceeding of a previous inconsistent
statement, if proved, as evidence of any fact stated therein. The ortho-
dox rule is still applicable to criminal proceedings in England,'6 how-
42. See Beaver & Biggs, Attending Witnesses' Prior Declarations as Evidence:
Theory vs. Reality, 3 IND. LEGAL F. 309, 323 n.59 (1970); Blakey, Substantive Use of Prior
Inconsistent Statements Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 64 Ky. L.J. 3, 20 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Blakey].
43. See Blakey, supra note 42, at 20, where the author suggests that the danger
arises because the rule itself is silent on the matter. However, in Pennsylvania, the test
for the sufficiency of the evidence has been clearly stated.
[Tihe test of the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, accepting as true all the
evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom, upon which if believed the jury
could properly have based its verdict, it is sufficient in law to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime or crimes of which he
has been convicted.
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 465 Pa. 442, 445, 350 A.2d 847, 848 (1976). See also Common-
wealth v. Fortune, 456 Pa. 365, 318 A.2d 327 (1974); Commonwealth v. Petrisko, 442 Pa.
575, 275 A.2d 46 (1971).
44. Evidence Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 28, § 1 provides in relevant part:
(1) In any civil proceedings where direct oral evidence of a fact would be ad-
missible, any statement made by a person in a document and tending to establish
that fact shall, on production of the original document, be admissible as evidence of
that fact if the following conditions are satisfied, that is to say-
(i) if the maker of the statement ...
(a) had personal knowledge of the matters dealt with by the statement...
... and
(ii) if the maker of the statement is called as a witness in the proceedings ....
45. Civil Evidence Act, 1968, c. 64, Pt. I, § 3 provides:
(1) Where in any civil proceedings-
(a) a previous inconsistent or contradictory statement made by a person called
as a witness in those proceedings is proved by virtue of section 3, 4 or 5 of
the Criminal Procedure Act 1865; or
(b) a previous statement made by a person called as aforesaid is proved for the
purpose of rebutting a suggestion that his evidence has been fabricated,
that statement shall be virtue of this subsection be admissible as evidence of any
fact stated therein of which direct oral evidence by him would be admissible.
46. See S. PHIPSON, EVIDENCE 286 (12th ed. 1976). The Criminal Law Revision Com-
mittee's 11th Report recommended provisions substantially similar to those of the 1968
1980 347
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ever, even though the 1968 Act seems to be moving toward complete
abolition of the hearsay rule. '
In 1942, the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence pro-
posed that any statement, written or oral, should be admissible if the
declarant was either unavailable or present at the trial and subject to
cross-examination." This rule has not been adopted in any jurisdiction,
presumably because it is so sweeping." The Uniform Rules of Evidence
in 1953 proposed that evidence of prior statements be admissible for
the truth of the fact stated where the declarant is available for cross-
examination on condition that the statement be otherwise admissible.'
The 1953 Uniform Rule was adopted in several states. 1
In 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted by Congress
after various versions had been debated in the House and Senate. 2
Act for the admissibility of previous statements of witnesses. See R. CROSS, EVIDENCE 500
(4th ed. 1974). See also Williams, The Proposals for Hearsay Evidence, 1973 CRIM. L. REV.
76.
47. For American references to the English statutes, see Graham, supra note 26, at
1584; Evans, Article Eight of the Federal Rules of Evidence: The Hearsay Rule, 8 VAL.
L. REV. 261 (1974); Stewart, supra note 35, at 2.
48. The model rule stated: "Evidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible if the
judge finds that the declarant (a) is unavailable as a witness, or (b) is present and subject
to cross-examination." MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 503 (1942).
49. See Read, The New Confrontation-Hearsay Dilemma, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 12
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Read].
50. The Uniform Rule provided:
Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a witness while testifying at
the hearing offered to prove the truth of the matter stated is hearsay evidence and
inadmissible except:
(1) Previous Statements of Persons Present and Subject to Cross Examination. A
statement previously made by a person who is present at the hearing and available
for cross examination with respect to the statement and its subject matter, prov-
vided the statement would be admissible if made by declarant while testifying as a
witness.
UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63 (1953 version).
51. The 1953 enactment of the Uniform Rules of Evidence was adopted by statute in
several jurisdictions. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 100-1550 (West 1966); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 60-401 to 470 (1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 84A-1 to 49 (West 1976); C.Z. CODE tit. 5,
H§ 2731-2996 (1963); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 771-956 (1967).
The new Uniform Rules of Evidence, which are almost identical to the Federal Rules
of Evidence, were approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on State Laws
in 1974, with some changes made in 1975. These new rules have been adopted in seven
states. See ARIZ. R. EVID. (West. Pamp. 1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001 (1979); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 90.101-.958 (West Pamp. 1979); MINN. R. EVID. (West Pamp. 1979); NEa.
REV. STAT. §§ 27-101 to 1103 (1975); N.D. R. EVID. 101-1103 (1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, H§ 2101-3103 (West Pamp. 1979). Still other states adopted the rule through case law.
See, e.g., Gelhaar v. State, 41 Wisc. 2d 230, 163 N.W.2d 609 (1969); Jett v. Commonwealth,
436 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969).
52. For a detailed discussion of these debates, see Graham, note 26 supra and
Stalmack, note 37 supra.
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The original Rule 801(d)(1)(A) proposed by the Advisory Committee
would have treated as non-hearsay all prior inconsistent statements if
the declarant testified at the trial and was subject to cross-examina-
tion." However, the Advisory Committee failed to persuade Congress
that all prior inconsistent statements should be admitted for substan-
tive purposes. The limitation on the final version reflects congressional
concern about the unreliability of statements which are offered into
evidence in the absence of proof that the statements were in fact
made. As adopted, the rule allows only the most reliable statements to
be introduced for substantive purposes, since they must have been
made while the declarant was under oath, subject to the penalty of
perjury, in a formal proceeding.' Since the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, an increasing number of states have enacted codes
of evidence patterned after the Federal Rules. However, the states
have not universally adopted the hearsay rules exactly as enacted in
the final version of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In some states, the
rule on prior inconsistent statements is identical to the Supreme
Court's proposed version, and in others, the rule has limitations which
are peculiar to the jurisdiction.' Challenges to these rules have been
largely foreclosed at the federal level, since the United States
Supreme Court held in California v. Green" that the confrontation
clause is not violated by the admission of a declarant's out-of-court
statements for substantive purposes, as long as the declarant is testify-
ing as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination.
53. This proposal, known as the Supreme Court's version, was put forth in 1972.
RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, Rule 801(d)(1)(A), 56
F.R.D. 183, 293 (1972). See also Stalmack, note 37 supra.
54. The final version treats the prior statements of a witness as non-hearsay if "[tihe
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning
the statement, and the statement is ... inconsistent with his testimony, and was given
under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in
a deposition ...." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). The term "other proceeding" has been inter-
preted to include grand jury proceedings, see, e.g., United States v. Coran, 589 F.2d 70
(1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Mosley, 555 F.2d 191 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 851
(1977); United States v. Henry, 448 F. Supp. 819 (D. N.J. 1978), and immigration interroga-
tions, see United States v. Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 983
(1976) (reasoning that interrogation is conducted with legal formality).
55. For example, NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-801(4)(9)(i) (1975) is identical to Federal Rule
801(d)(1)(A); ARIZ. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) (West. Pamp. 1978) is identical to the Supreme
Court's version; and MICH. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) (Pamp. 1979) provides that the statement is
not hearsay if the declarant is subject to cross-examination on the statement and the
statement is one of identification. See Wieder & Speed, Evidence, Hearsay and the
Federal Rules of Evidence: A Practitioner's Guide, 1977 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 621, citing
the state codes patterned after the Federal Rules of Evidence. See also 3A J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1018 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
56. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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The rule adopted by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Common-
wealth v. Loar is broader than the federal rule, since it allows the sub-
stantive use of any prior inconsistent statement by a witness who is
available for cross-examination at trial. The Loar court was persuaded
by the Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A) that the
requirement of the oath and formal proceeding is unnecessary." This is
a plausible approach, as there are other exceptions to the hearsay rule
which do not require the statement admitted to have been made under
oath, provided that the statement is sufficiently trustworthy by its
nature to minimize the risk of recent fabrication." Moreover, by requir-
ing the declarant to be available for cross-examination at the trial as a
predicate to admissibility, the Loar rule satisfies the requirement of
the confrontation clause as enunciated in Green.59 The effect of the
Loar rule will be to increase the amount of relevant and reliable infor-
mation which is brought before the fact finder." With its decision in
Loar, the court has taken an enlightened step, joining the scholars,
courts, and legal draftsmen who over the last forty years have shown a
perception of the realities of what goes on in the courtroom, and who
have urged the substantive use of all prior inconsistent statements,
provided that the declarant is available for cross-examination.
Stephanie G. Spaulding
57. 399 A.2d at 1117-18. But see text accompanying notes 54 & 55 supra for discus-
sion of the reasons why Congress rejected the Advisory Committee's recommendations.
58. See Moore & Bendix, Congress, Evidence and Rulemaking, 84 YALE L.J. 9, 31-33
(1974). See also note 36 and accompanying text supra.
59. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
60. See Silbert, note 38 supra.
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